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CASE BRIEFS
AGENCY
Reasonable Minds Could Differ Whether Physician Was Acting as
Private Physician or as Agent of Planned Parenthood
The Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Twelfth Appellate District
reversed the Butler County Court of Common Pleas' order granting
summary judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood of Southwest Ohio
and Northern Kentucky based on a claim of negligence.1 The court
found reversal was appropriate because there were genuine issues of
material fact regarding whether the plaintiffs physician was acting as
the apparent agent for Planned Parenthood when he performed
2plaintiff's delivery.
In August 1996, Candice Sevruk ("Sevruk") sought care for her
pregnancy through Planned Parenthood of Southwest Ohio and
Northern Kentucky. 3 Planned Parenthood provided Sevruk with both a
"Perinatal Care Information Sheet" and a "Request for Perinatal Care,"
which required her to initial several statements indicating she had read,
understood, and agreed with them.4 One statement informed Sevruk
that members of her "Care Team" would include Dr. Phillip Carr and
Dr. G. Habib Nackhla. 5  Another statement informed Sevruk her
delivery would be preformed at Fort Hamilton-Hughes Hospital,
attended by Dr. Nackhla.6
In late January 1997, Planned Parenthood agreed to allow Ms.
Sevruk to deliver her baby at Mercy Hospital rather than at Fort
Sevruk et al. v. Carr, M.D. et al., 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4781 at *19 (12th
Dist. September 9, 2002).
2 Id. at *15.
' Id. at *2
' Id. at *2-3.
5 Id. at *4.
6 Sevruk, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4781 at *3.
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Hamilton-Hughes.7 Throughout her pregnancy, Dr. Carr was the only
physician at Planned Parenthood to actually see Sevruk. 8 In January
1997, Dr. Carr delivered baby Sean via C-section at Mercy Hospital
after an unsuccessful attempt at a forceps delivery.9 In August 1997,
Ms. Sevruk brought a negligence claim in Butler County Common
Pleas Court against Dr. Car, his corporation and Mercy Hospital,
alleging Sean had sustained skull fractures and other injuries as a result
of Dr. Carr's negligent use of forceps during the delivery.' 
0
After summary judgment was granted to Mercy Hospital, Sevruk
amended her complaint adding Planned Parenthood as a defendant,
alleging Dr. Carr had been an agent of Planned Parenthood when he
delivered Sean.II The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Planned Parenthood, holding reasonable jurors would conclude Dr.
Carr was not an agent of Planned Parenthood.12 Sevruk appealed the
decision.
13
The main issue was whether the trial court erred in granting
Planned Parenthood summary judgment on the apparent agency
claim. 14 The Court held a reasonable jury could find Sevruk was
unaware Planned Parenthood did not provide delivery services, and Dr.
Carr was its agent. 15  Sevruk could reasonably infer Planned
Parenthood was providing Dr. Nackhla's services as delivery physician
because of the inclusion of his name on the forms presented to Sevruk
at the beginning of her treatment. 16 Additionally, Dr. Carr failed to
make clear to Sevruk he would be acting as a private physician during
the delivery, and not as an agent of Planned Parenthood.
17
Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood was
reversed. 18 Sevruk et al. v. Carr, MD. et al., 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS
4781 (12th Dist. September 9, 2002).
7 Id. at *4, 5.
8 1d. at *4.
9 Id. at *5.
'o1d. at *5.
"Sevruk, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4781 at *6.
12 Id.
I3 d. at *7.
I4 d. at *8.
I5 ld. at *15.
16 Sevruk., 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4781 at *10.
17 Id. at *14.
" I. at *19.
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CRIME
Defendant Found to be a "Sexually Violent Predator" After
Determination Was Made That He Would Likely Engage in
"Sexually Violent Criminal" Behavior Upon Release
The Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment of the Court of
Appeal, holding that the Sexually Violent Predators Act ("SVPA")
requires the fact-finder to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, that a
defendant will likely behave in a "sexually violent predatory"
demeanor upon release before committing or recommitting that
defendant. 1 9
In the present case the court decided whether the defendant would
likely "engage in sexually violent criminal behavior," and also if the
behavior would likely be directed "toward a stranger, a person of casual
acquaintance with whom no substantial relationship exists, or an
individual with whom a relationship has been established or promoted
for the primary purpose of victimization.', 20  The defendant has an
extensive past of sexually violent behavior against minors. 21 His last
arrest was for sodomy and committing other lascivious acts against
three minors.
22
The court defined a "sexually violent predator" as an individual
who has been convicted for engaging in sexually violent criminal
offenses against two or more victims and will likely to do so again.
23
In addition, the predator must be diagnosed with a mental disorder
which contributes to this behavior. 24 Accordingly, sexually violent
criminal offenses consistent with SVPA includes rape that is forcible,
spousal, in concert, and vulgar acts against anyone less than 14 years
old.25 Moreover, the State Department of Mental Health establishes the
necessary procedure for determining whether a prisoner is a predator.26
According to procedure, two physicians made a positive determination,
that the defendant was a likely predator, and both diagnosed the
'9 People v. Richard Hurtado, 28 Cal. 4th 1179 at* 1 (Cal. 2002).
20 Id. at *2.
21 Id. at *6-7.
22 Id. at *6-7.
23 Id. at *3.
24 Hurtado, 28 Cal. 4th 1179 *3.
25 Id. at *4.
26 Id.
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defendant with a mental disorder that caused his sexually violent
criminal behavior, and a petition was filed for his commitment.27
The court concluded that there was reason to believe that the
defendant would engage in "sexually violent criminal" behavior
following his release.28 Therefore, his commitment label as a predator
was correct, and the judgment was affirmed.29 People v. Richard
Hurtado, 28 Cal. 4th 1/ 79 (Cal. 2002).
Penal Code Authorizing, Under Specified Conditions, Extended
Commitment of a Person Found Not Guilty of a Felony by Reason
of Insanity Beyond the Maximum Term of Commitment to Which
the Person Could Have Been Sentenced for the Underlying Offense
Does Not Violate a Person's Due Process and Equal Protection
Rights by Excluding Time Spent on an Outpatient Status.
The Court of Appeals of California, Third Appellate District held that
under the California Penal Code, the defendant, a person found not
guilty by reason of insanity for an assault on a peace officer with a
firearm, is not denied his due process or equal protection rights when a
court excludes time spent as an outpatient in the maximum term of
commitment to which defendant would have been sentenced for assault
with a firearm. 3
0
John Douglas Crosswhite (defendant) pleaded guilty to assault on
a peace officer with a firearm. 1 On October 15, 1980 defendant was
found not guilty by reason of insanity.3 2 Defendant was diagnosed with
chronic paranoid schizophrenia and committed to Napa State Hospital
(Hospital) for a maximum term of seven years.3 3 Defendant agreed to
have his term of commitment extended for two years pursuant to
California Penal Code and the trial court ordered he be released as an
outpatient.34 In February 1988, approximately seven years later, the
California Department of Health (Department) notified the trial court
that defendant had been returned to the Hospital after attempting
27 Id. at *4-5.
21 /d. at *13.
29 Hurfado, 28 Cal. 4th 1179 at * i 3.
30 People v. Crosswhite, 101 Cal. App. 4th 494 (3rd Dist. 2002).
Id. at 498.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 498.
34 Id.
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suicide and defendant had requested revocation of his outpatient
status.35 Subsequently, the trial court granted the Department's request
to withdraw the revocation and send the defendant to the Conditional
Release Program (CONREP).36
For the next eleven years up to April 1999, the trial court granted
CONREP's request to extend defendant's outpatient status for another
year. 37 In April 1999, defendant's mother complained defendant was
not taking his medication and threatening to leave the State.
38
Consequently, the trial court granted CONREP's immediate request to
revoke defendant's outpatient status.39  Subsequently, the District
Attorney petitioned the trial court for a two-year extension of
defendant's commitment. 40 The trial court held a bench trial to hear
medical reports on defendant's status. The trial court found that the
expert medical reports indicated that defendant still represented a
substantial danger of physical harm to others in the community.4' The
trial court ordered defendant's commitment to be extended by two
42years. Defendant appealed the order, claiming that the eleven years
he spent in outpatient status should be included in his maximum
commitment and that the exclusion of this time violates his due process
and equal protection rights because it allows for an open-ended
commitment.43
The first issue the court addressed is whether the exclusion of
years spent as an outpatient violates defendant's due process and equal
protection rights.44 The defendant relied on the proposition in In re
Moye, that he be afforded a commitment hearing; at such a hearing the
state would have the burden of proving substantial dangerousness
because equal protection principles require a shift of the burden of
proof to the state after a defendant has exceeded the maximum term for
the underlying offense.45 The court held there is no denial of equal
35 Crosswhite, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 498.
36 Id. at 499.
" Id. at 499-501.
31 Id. at 500.39 id.
40 Crosswhite, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 500.
41 Id. at 501.
42 id.
43 Id. at 502.
44 Id.
15 Crosswhite, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 503, citing In re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 171, 729
P.2d 839 (1987).
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protection; Moye is distinguishable from this case because it deals with
a violation of equal protection between two different classes of
committees, but the statutes cited in Moye treated outpatient status
exactly the same as in this case: outpatient status did not count toward
the maximum time of commitment. 46 As to the due process violation,
the court noted that the state can take measures to restrict the freedom
of the dangerously mentally ill as a legitimate non-punitive government
objective.4 v Further, the court noted that the United States Supreme
Court has sustained other civil commitment statutes similar to the one
at issue when the statute couples proof of dangerousness with the proof
of an additional factor, such as mental illness.48 Therefore, the court
held the statutory scheme at issue does not violate due process.
49
The second issue the Courts addressed is whether there is
substantial evidence that defendant continues to pose a substantial
physical danger to others. 50 The court noted that whether a defendant
with a mental disease represents a substantial danger of physical harm
to others is a question of fact to be resolved with expert testimony.
51
The evidence consists of medical reports by two physicians who had
examined the defendant. 52 The court concluded these reports were
made for the sole purpose of recommending whether defendant posed a
substantial danger of physical harm to others in the community. 53 The
court found both reports indicate defendant still represents a substantial
danger and defendant's commitment should be extended.54 The Court
of Appeals affirmed the order to extend defendant's recommitment by
two-years. 55 People v. Crosswhite, 101 Cal. App. 4th 494 (3rd Dist.
2002).
46 Id. at 505.
41 Id. at 507.
48 Id.
49 ld.
50 Crosswhite, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 507.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 508.
53 id.
14 Id. at 508-509.
55 Crosswhite, 101 Cal. App. 4th at 509.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Commissioner for Department of Corrections Given Notice to
Provide Reasonable Medical Treatment for Inmate Diagnosed
With Gender Identity Disorder
The United States District Court for The District of Massachusetts held
the Commissioner for the Massachusetts Department of Corrections
(Commissioner) had a duty to respond reasonably by authorizing
proper treatment for an inmate diagnosed with a severe form of gender
identity disorder ("GID").56
Plaintiff sought an injunction from the court to require the
Commissioner's compliance with the Harry Benjamin Standards of
Care (the "Standards of Care") for GID. 57 If granted, the injunction
would require administration of female hormones, sex reassignment
surgery, or both.58  GID is a medically documented, major mental
illness treated on an individual basis in accordance with the Standards
of Care. 59 GID is understood as the source of the plaintiffs belief that
he is a woman trapped in a man's body, thus causing him to suffer
mentally. 6° Sufficient treatment involves one or more of the following
treatments including psychotherapy with a qualified therapist, the
administration of female hormones, or sex reassignment surgery.
6 1
Denial of these medical treatments while imprisoned, the plaintiff
argued, violated his Eighth Amendment protection from unnecessary
infliction of pain as a prisoner.
62
While the court must find the prisoners' care minimally adequate,
it must also show deference to the prison officials regarding the form of
care they find adequate. 63 Moreover, adequate care requires that a
party deliver care of a quality accepted by professional standards in the
56 Michelle Kosilek v. Michael T. Maloney, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16101
(Mass. Dist. Ct. 2002).
7 Id. at *4.
58 Id. at *4.
I d. at * 1-2.
60 Id. at *1-2.
61 Kosilek, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16101 at *2-3.
62 Id. at *9.
63 Id. at *9.
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community.64 Serious medical need involves considerable danger of
65serious harm if adequate treatment is not received.
Plaintiff was able to show that he had a serious medical need,
which was not being adequately treated.66 However, he was not able to
prove the Commissioner was deliberately indifferent to his medical
need, and that such indifference would likely continue in the future.
67
The court reasoned the Commissioner's denial of the plaintiffs
treatment did not stem from an intention to cause pain or out of
deliberate indifference.
68
Although the court validated the defendant's reluctance resulting
from security concerns for Eighth Amendment purposes, it did not
recognize his anticipation of criticisms or concerns over cost as
releasing him of his constitutional duty to protect the rights of those
who are incarcerated. 69 Furthermore, the court concluded its decision
served as notice to the Commissioner of his duty to respond reasonably
to the plaintiffs serious medical need.7 ° In addition to a qualified
medical consultation for treatment, the court suggested the
Commissioner at least allow the plaintiff to receive psychotherapy with
a qualified professional.7 ' Michelle Kosilek v. Michael T. Maloney,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16101 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2002).
DISABILITY
The Americans With Disabilities Act Requires a Person With
Insulin-Treated Diabetes Mellitus (ITDM) to be Assessed On an
Individualized Basis to Determine Whether That Person is
Disabled Under the Act.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held, on
second appeal, that an individualized assessment of a person with
insulin-treated diabetes mellitus (ITDM) is required to determine his
64 Id. at *8.
65 Id. at *8.
66 Kosilek, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16101 at *10.
67 Id. at *10.
681 d. at *12.
691 d. at *12.
70 1d. at *13.
7" Kosilek, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16101 at *13.
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present ability to safely perform the essential functions of a San
Antonio Police Department (SAPD) officer.72
Plaintiff-Appellant Kapche has insulin-treated diabetes mellitus
(ITDM).73 Kapche applied with the San Antonio Police Department
(SAPD).74 Although he passed both a written test and a background
check, the (SAPD) informed Kapche that he was disqualified because
of his ITDM.75 Kapche filed suit under the American with Disabilities
Act (ADA).76 The District Court granted summary judgment for the
City of San Antonio (Appellee) and dismissed the action finding that
Kapche was not qualified to be a police officer with SAPD.77 Kapche
appealed and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the
district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for a
determination of whether there presently exists new or improved
technology that could permit insulin-dependent diabetic drivers, and
Kapche specifically, to operate a vehicle safely. 78 The Fifth Circuit
concluded that the Appellee's physicians did not conduct an
individualized assessment of Kapche's present ability to perform the
essential functions of a police officer safely.79
Upon remand, the district court concluded the City of San Antonio
was justified in rejecting Kapche's application.8 0 However, the district
court dismissed the action without addressing the merits of whether
Kapche was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job,
thereby ignoring the Fifth Circuit's mandate. 8 1  Kapche again
appealed.
8 2
The issue before the Fifth Circuit is whether the district court was
correct to ignore the earlier mandate and whether summary judgment
was properly granted for the City of San Antonio. The district court
relied on a per se rule that, as a matter of law, a driver with insulin
dependent diabetes presents a genuine substantial risk that he could
72 Kapche v. City of San Antonio, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17961 at *20 (5th
Circ. August 30, 2002).
73 Id. at * 1.
74 id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at *2.
77 Kapche, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17961 at *2.
78 Id. at *5.
79 Id. at *6.
" Id. at *7.
81 d.
12 Kapche, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17961 at *8.
2002]
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injure himself or others. 8 3 The rule was later applied to a claim under
the ADA. 84 The Fifth Circuit found the per se rule relied upon is now
inapplicable in light of more recent decisions by the United States
Supreme Court.85 The Fifth Circuit found the intervening Supreme
Court cases consistently point to an individualized assessment
mandated by the ADA under various sections of the Act.86 The Fifth
Circuit held an individualized assessment of Kapche's present ability to
safely perform the essential functions of a SAPD police officer is
required. 87 The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of the
City's motion for summary judgment and remanded the action to the
district court to proceed according to the holding. 88 Kapche v. City of
San Antonio, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17961 (5th Circ. August 30, 2002).
Evidence of Plaintiff's Narcotic Dependency Discredited Her
Testimony and Affirmed the Commissioner of Social Security's
Denial of Her Application for Disability Benefits
The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska affirmed
the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) to
deny the plaintiffs application for disability insurance benefits under
Title II of the Social Security Act.
89
The court had to decide "whether there was substantial evidence
on the record as a whole to support the... decision [to deny plaintiffs
application]." 90 Plaintiff claimed her medical conditions rendered her
disabled and unable to work full-time. 9 1  However, her previous
application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration before
an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). 9 2 Consequently, plaintiff sought
review of the Commissioner's decision to deny her application arguing
(1) "the Commissioner did not apply the proper legal standards"; (2)
" Id. at *4.
84 I.
85 Id. at *11.
86 Id. at *17.
Kapche, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17961 at *20.
ggId. at *21.
89 Armandina Sanchez-Wentz v. Jo Anne B. Bamhardt, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15953 at *1 (Neb. Dist. Ct. 2002).
9 Id. at *6.
'I Id. at *2.
92 Id.
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"the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial
evidence"; (3) "the Commissioner's credibility finding is not supported
by substantial evidence"; and (4) "the Commissioner did not give the
proper weight to the opinion of the claimant's treating physician and
psychologist.
'
"
93
A five-part analysis was required to determine the plaintiffs
disability. 94 First, a conclusion of disability could be reached if the
plaintiff was engaged in any substantially productive activity. 95 The
court would find the plaintiff not disabled based on the second part, if
she was not able to prove at least one impairment restricting her ability
to do fundamental work activities. 96 The claimant will be found
disabled in the third part of the analysis if she is found to have at least
one impairment that is listed or equivalent to a listed impairment on a
predetermined list.97 The claimant will be found not disabled in the
fourth part if the impairment would not prevent her from partaking in
past work.98 Looking at the plaintiffs remaining functional capacity,
her age, education, and previous occupational experience, the fifth part
requires that the plaintiff be found disabled if the Commissioner is not
able to show that the claimant is unable to perform other types of
work. 99
It follows that review of the aforementioned five-part analysis, as
well as the Polaski factors, which included an analysis of the plaintiffs
prior work record, and her medical evidence confirmed the ALJ's
determination discrediting plaintiffs testimony due to the likelihood of
her narcotic dependency. 00 Moreover, credibility conclusions of ALJs
are afforded "considerable weight."' 1 1  Although the court
acknowledged the considerable magnitude of the plaintiffs medical
history, it also recognized that aspects of her medical history were the
likely result of her drug addiction.' 
02
9' Id. at *6.
94 Sanchez-Wentz, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *8.
95 Id.
96 Id.
9' Id. at *9.
98 Id.
99 Sanchez- Wentz, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *9-10.
'oo Id. at *16.
"' Id. at *11.
102 Id. at *18.
2002]
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Furthermore, the court concluded that substantial evidence
showing the plaintiffs exaggeration of her medical conditions affirmed
previous decisions to deny her disability benefits.'0 3  Armandina
Sanchez-Wentz v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15953
(Neb. Dist. Ct. 2002).
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Child Psychologist Does Not Owe a Fiduciary Duty to Parents
The Supreme Court of Colorado held a parent's claims of breach of
fiduciary duty and negligence against her children's psychologist
should be dismissed as the psychologist tylically only owes a fiduciary
duty to the children, and not to the parent.
The plaintiff, Denise Mitchell (Mitchell), a divorced woman, hired
the defendant, Gloria Ryder (Ryder), as a therapist to her two children
after concluding that her children were being abused during visits with
their father. 105 The therapist orally asserted that the children were
actually suffering from alienation from their father, rather than
abuse. 10 6 Mitchell refused this diagnosis, threatened to sue defendant
for failing to substantiate her findings of abuse, and sought to have the
children placed with a new therapist. 10 Ryder expressed her concern
with removing the children from her therapy in a letter.' °8 The letter
also addressed Ryder's doubt regarding the father's alleged abuse or
the danger he posed to the children, and her concern with Mitchell's
handling of the situation.' 0 9 This letter was sent to the children's father
and new therapist. °10 Subsequently, the children's father sought to
have the children placed in his custody; however, custody remained
unchanged.'
In response to Mrs. Mitchell's ex husband, David Mitchell's
motion for custody, Mrs. Mitchell sued Ryder for breach of fiduciary
'03 Id. at *40.
104 Ryder v. Mitchell, 2002 Colo. LEXIS 816 at *1 (Colo. September 16, 2002).
"05 Id. at *5.
106 Id. at *6.
07 Id. at *6.
'o8 Id. at *7.
'09 Ryder, 2002 Colo. LEXIS 816 at *8-9.
... Id. at *9.
111 Id.
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duty and negligence. 112 The trial court dismissed the claims onsummary judgement and awarded Ryder attorney's fees and costs in
holding that as the children's therapist owed no duty to Mitchell,
Mitchell lacked standing to sue on her own behalf.113 On appeal the
court determined Ryder owed Mitchell a duty of care in writing and
sending a letter expressing her opinion, expanding upon the court'sholding in Montoya v. Bebensee. 1on Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded the case, including the award of attorney's fees
and costs. 115
The issue before the court was whether a child's therapist owes a
fiduciary duty to the child's parents. 116 The court determined that
while the issue involves a question of law, it must also determine
whether summary judgement was appropriate. 117 The court agreed
with the trial court's holding, and distinguishes the present case from
the one used in support of the court of appeal's holding, Montoya. 118
In deciding whether a therapist owes their patients' parents a duty
the court examined "the risk involved, the forseeability and likelihood
of injury as weighed against the social utility of defendant's conduct,
the magnitude of the burden guarding against the harm, and the
consequences of placing the burden of a duty on the defendant."9 The
court determined that the interest in a therapist's ability to convey their
findings regarding any influence the parents may be having upon the
children's mental condition outweighed the risk of the therapist
conveying a faulty opinion regarding such influence. 120 In addition, the
court distinguished Montoya on the grounds that it involved a case in
which the therapist was alleging a parent's sexual abuse of the children,
an allegation that greatly exceeds criticism of a parental decision in
terms of the possible legal consequences. 12 1 Accordingly, the courtheld the claims were properly dismissed in summary judgement by the
1"2 Id. at*9-11.
114 Ryder, 2002 Colo. LEXIS 816 at * 11-12; see also, Montoya v. Bebensee,
761 P.2d 285 (Colo. App. 1988) (holding that children's therapist owes parents a duty
of care in making any opinion based public report or recommendation.)
"'' Id. at *11-12.
116 Id. at *13.117 Id. at *14-15.
... Id. at *25, 30.
"' Ryder, 2002 Colo. LEXIS 816 at *24.
20 Id. at *26-28.
121 Id. at *25-26.
2002]
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trial court, and remanded the case for resolution of issues regarding
attorney's fees and costs. 122 Ryder v. Mitchell, 2002 Colo. LEXIS 816
(Colo. September 16, 2002).
EVIDENCE
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Trumped By Dangerous Patient
Exception Where Threat is Serious and Imminent and Danger is
Avoided Only by Disclosure
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the lower
court did not error when in light of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
it admitted evidence of a psychiatrist's testimony.
123
Chase is a patient with bipolar disorder type II who received
Social Security disability benefits for his mental and physical problems
and began receiving treatment from a psychiatrist in 1997.124 Chase
had appointments every few months with Dr. Dieter for counseling and
medical management in which he displayed anger, obsessive thoughts
of harming others associated with him through business and legal
actions, including two FBI agents, and sudden changes of emotions.
125
In August of 1998 during a counseling session, Chase confessed to Dr.
Dieter that he had begun drinking and showed Dr. Dieter a list of the
names of people he thought of injuring or killing and including people
he had threatened on different occasions the past five years."' Dr.
Dieter became concerned about the possible reality of Chase acting out
on any of his threats, and specifically warned Chase that if he gave her
specifics on any action against these people, she would be obliged to
warn them. 1
27
Dr. Dieter discussed the situation with her supervisor and was
advised that she may want to gather more information from Chase.
128
Chase called Dr. Dieter October, 18 after an argument with his wife
and in conversation noted that he had a life insurance policy that would
122 [d. at *30.
123 U.S. v. Chase, 301 F.3d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 2002).
124 Id.
121 1d. at 1020-21.
126 Id. at 1021.
127 1d. at 1021.
128 Chase, 301 F.3d at 1022.
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pay out if anything happened to him. 129 Dr. Dieter, after consulting
with both her supervisor and the clinic's legal counsel, informed the
local police department of Chase's threats.' 30 The next day Dr. Dieter
was contacted by the FBI and agreed to solicit more information from
Chase. 131 On October 27, at the next appointment, Chase confided that
his frustration was growing from his arguments with his wife and his
mother's diagnosis of cancer, and he was going to get justice by way of
the gun against the people with the lien against his house and those on
his list, and their children.' 32 Because of this information the FBI
obtained a search warrant to search Chase's home; Chase became
aware of such action, and left several voice mails concerning the action
with Dr. Dieter.' 33 When the FBI arrived at the Chase home, after a
series of cell phone calls, Chase left his gun on a table and walked
outside to surrender, claiming the only one he referred to killing was
himself, and the threat against the others was merely hypothetical. 34
Chase was arrested and charged with three counts, yet challenged the
admissibility of Dr. Dieter's testimony about his statements during his
counseling sessions, and the evidence of his threats. 135 The lower court
concluded that the psychotherapist-patient privilege did not apply, and
the evidence was admissible. 1
36
The Court of Appeals reviewed both the issue of privilege and the
admissibility of evidence, under rule 404(b) pertaining to the judge's
discretion of rule 403, de novo.137 The Court held, in harmony with the
precedent set in the Jaffee court, a dangerous patient exception exists in
the psychotherapist-patient relationship where there is a threat of
serious and imminent harm and the harm can only be averted by means
of disclosure to a therapist. 38 Chase contended that there were other
ways to avert the danger, however the Court affirmed the district
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1023.
133 Chase, 301 F.3d at *1023-24.
114 Id. at 1024-25.
'15 Id. at 1025.
136 Id. at 1026.
131 Id. at 1027-28.
138 Chase, 301 F.3d at 1030-31 (citingJaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996)).
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court's finding that disclosure to the authorities was the only was to
avoid the harm where Dr. Dieter's concerns were reasonable. 
139
In evaluating the decision to admit the evidence, the Court first
explained that Chase was angry with the FBI agents because of his
view that their inaction to investigate his complaints against named
individuals. 140 Second the court found that under 18 U.S.C. §
I l5(a)(1)(B), threatening federal agents with intent to retaliate is a
crime. 141 The evidence of retaliatory threats, explicitly against the
federal agents, was therefore necessary to provide intent. 14' The
standard used was whether reasonably and objectively the intended
person would interpret the words as a threat of harm, not whether the
defendant was able to actually carry out the threat; thus the entire facts
and circumstances surrounding the threat must be admitted.
1 43
Therefore, the court concluded the lower court did not error by
admitting the psychiatrist's testimony, and the judgment was
affirmed. 144 U.S. v. Chase, 301 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2002).
EXPERT WITNESS
SANE Nurse's Testimony As to Causation of Injuries Does Not
Constitute the Practice of Medicine.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed Mohajer's convictions of
forcible sodomy and inanimate object penetration. 45 The court found
that the trial court did not error in allowing a Sexual Assault Nurse
Examiner (SANE) to testify to the cause of Ward's injuries and in
finding the evidence sufficient to support both convictions. 1
46
Miranda Ward, an eighteen-year old high school student, and a
friend went to Ana Visage Skin and Body Care to receive their first
professional massage. 147 Mohajer entered and introduced himself as
39 Id. at 1032-33.
141 Id. at 1037.
141 Id. at 1041.
142 Id. at 1042-1047.
143 Chase, 301 F.3d at 1049-1050.
144 id. at 1056
145 Vahid Mohajer v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 550 at
*1.
146 Id. at*10-11, *15.
147 Id. at *2.
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"Steve" and informed Ward that he would perform the massage.14 ' At
the beginning of Ward's session, the door to her room remained ajar
and she able to converse with her friend directly across the hall.' 49
Ward's friend was placed in a separate room and at that point Mohajer
closed the door. 1
5 0
Mohajer then began to move his hands down Ward's chest until he
reached her breasts. 151 At this point Ward did not know if that was
suppose to happen but then realized it was wrong when Mohajer's
hands squeezed her breasts harder. 152  Ward testified that she was
confused and did not know how to react.' 53 Mohajer began messaging
Ward's leg upward until his hand reached her vagina and he inserted
first one finger and the two. 154 Ward testified that at this point her body
"just locked down", she clutched her fist and began to cry.' 55 Ward
testified that she was scared to death.' 56 Next, Mohajer took out his
penis and grabbed Ward's head and turned it. 157 Ward attempted to
turn her head and fight but testified that something in her told her she
could not.158 Mohajer hit Ward in the face with his penis and then
"shoved it into her mouth." 159
The first issue before the court is whether Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-
2900 prohibits a SANE nurse to testify in sexual assault cases because
such testimony constitutes the practice of medicine. 160 The Supreme
Court of Virginia recently held that a SANE nurse's testimony
regarding causation of injuries of a sexual assault victim is not the
practice of medicine.' 6' Therefore, the court held that a SANE nurse
148 Id.
149 Mohajer, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 550 at *2-3.
50 Id. at *3.
151 Id. at *3.
52 ld
113 Id. at *4.
154 Mohajer, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 550 at *4.
155 Id. at *4.
156 id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at*4-5.
159 Mohajer, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 550 at *5.
160 Id. at *10.
161 Velazquez v. Commonwealth, 557 S.E.2d 213 (Va. 2002), cited in Mohajer
at *11.
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need not be licensed to practice medicine to testify to the causation of
the injuries in a sexual assault. 162
The second issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to
establish the acts of sodomy and animate object penetration were done
by intimidation or force. 163 The court reasoned Ward's testimony that
Mohajer "grabbed her head" and turned it toward him, as well as him
hitting her with his penis and forcing it into her mouth was sufficient
for a jury to conclude sodomy by force.1 64  The court also found
sufficient evidence to show that Mohajer used intimidation to
accomplish animate object penetration. 165 The court reasoned Ward's
fear of bodily harm inherent in the assault, prevented her from
communicating her objection and was sufficient of overbear her will.166
Ward's statements of fear and vaginal injury would allow a reasonable
juror to infer that Mohajer intimated her into submission. 16 7
Accordingly, Mohajer convictions of forcible sodomy and animate
object penetration were affirmed.168 Vahid Mohajer v. Commonwealth
of Virginia, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 550 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2002).
Expert Witness Who Has Not Recently Engaged In the Actual
Performance of the Procedures At Issue Is Not a Qualified Expert.
Expert Testimony Is Needed to Establish Standard of Care,
Breach, and Causation.
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Virginia Court of Appeals
finding the purpose of Va. Code Ann. §8.01-581.20 was to prevent
testimony by an individual not recently engaged in the actual
performance of procedures at issue. 169 The court also affirmed the
Virginia Court of Appeals' finding by concluding the failure to timely
diagnose a hip fracture, to properly supervise, and to implement a care
plan are not within a juror's common knowledge. 170
162 Mohajer, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 550 at *11.
163 Id. at *12.
164Mohajer, 2002 Va. App. LEXIS 550 at *13.
165 Id.
166 Id. at*14.
167 Id. at *15
168 Id.
169 Perdieu v. Blackstone Family Practice Ctr., Inc., 2002 Va. LEXIS 98, at *1
(Va. Sept. 13, 2002).
17 Id. at *1.
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Lucile P. Overton was admitted as a patient to Heritage Hall
Health Care.' 7 ' Overton suffered two falls within the first month and
was not diagnosed with any injury. 172 Due to her deteriorating physical
and psychological condition, Overton underwent x-rays and was found
to have sustained a hip fracture. 73  Lucile P. Overton, now deceased,
filed a four count motion for judgment against Blackstone Family
Practice Center, Inc. ("BFPC"), Dr. Rosenbaum, and HCMF
Corporation ("HCMF"). 174 Upon Overton unrelated death, her son
Perdieu was assigned as the administrator of Overton's estate.
175
Perdieu designated eight experts, three of which were excluded as
qualified experts by the Circuit Court of Nottoway County
(Virginia). 176
The issues before the court was whether the trial court erred in
excluding three of Perdieu's expert witnesses, and whether it erred in
granting defendants' motion to strike when Perdieu did not present
expert testimony to establish the standard of care, breach, or
causation. 17 7 The court held the purpose of Code § 8.01-581.20 was "to
prevent testimony by an individual who has not recently engaged in the
actual performance of procedures at issue in a case." '17 8 The court
concluded the expert witnesses were excluded because they did not
have a clinical practice within one year of the alleged malpractice, they
did not have experience in a relevant field of nursing home care, and
they had not treated nursing home patients for over 30 years.'
79
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
qualify the experts.1
80
The court also held a jury did not possess the common knowledge
to recognize whether a fracture is diagnosed in a timely manner,
whether a resident physician is appropriately supervised, and the
appropriate standard of care for treating nursing home patients.' 8 1 The
171 Id.
172 Id. at *2-3.
13 Id. at *3.
174 Perdieu, 2002 Va. LEXIS 98 at *3.
175 Id. at *5.
176 Id.
178 Id. at "15-16.
171 Sami v. Varn, 535 S.E.2d 172, 175 (Va. 2000) cited in Perdieu at *20.
179 Perdieu., 2002 Va. LEXIS 98 at *19-20
0o Id. at *20.
"s Id. at *24-26.
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court reasoned that because Perdieu failed to provide expert testimony
on the above issues, he failed to prove a cause of action against
defendants. 182 The trial court did not abuse its discretion to exclude
proposed expert witnesses nor in striking plaintiffs evidence therefore,
the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. 183 Perdieu v. Blackstone
Family Practice Ctr., Inc., 2002 Va. LEXIS 98 (Va. Sept. 13, 2002).
Question of Damages Properly Submitted to Jury and Expert
Testimony Properly Submitted at Trial
The Court of Appeals of Ohio Second Appellate District Montgomery
County affirmed the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas'
jury verdict in favor of plaintiff patient, her husband and two sons.' 84
The Court held the issue of damages relating to the patient's breast
cancer and her cardiomyopathy was properly submitted to the jury.18 5
It also held that the lower court properly admitted certain expert
testimony at trial. 1
86
Plaintiff, Tara Lynn Smith, found a lump in her right breast in
early 1995.187 After consulting with her gynecologist, plaintiff
underwent a mammogram.188 Dr. Josef Wenker of Radiology
Physicians compared the mammogram to a mammogram taken on the
patient from the previous year and determined everything was
normal. 189 Dr. Wenker recommended a follow up mammogram within
I to 2 years.190
In November 1995, plaintiff sought further evaluation of the lump
in her right breast and a malignant tumor was discovered, which had
spread to lymph nodes under her right arm. 19' Plaintiff underwent
aggressive chemotherapy treatment for her cancer.192 As a result of the
treatment, she became afflicted with cardiomyopathy, or weakness of
182 Id, at * 26.
183 d. at *27.
114 Smith et al. v. Daneshjoo, M.D. et al., 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4487 at *18
(2nd Dist. August 23, 2002).
185 Id. at *7.
18 6 Id. at 11-12.
187 1d. at *1.
188 Id.
"9 Smith et al., 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4487 at *2.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at *3.
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the heart muscle.1 93 Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against Radiology
Physicians for failing to diagnose her cancer in early 1995. 194
The first issue was whether the lower court erred in concluding
there was sufficient evidence to submit the issue of damages to the
jury. 19  The court held there was significant evidence from which a
jury could conclude plaintiff s damages were caused by the delay in her
diagnosis. 196 Therefore, the lower court properly submitted the
question of damages to the jury. 197
The second issue was whether the lower court erred in admitting
elicited hearsay testimony from plaintiffs expert witnesses, Dr. Reed
and Dr. Singer. 19 The court held it was proper for Dr. Reed to rely on
studies, in which he had actively participated, in forming the basis of
his opinion. 199 The court further held Dr. Singer properly based his
opinion on studies regarding breast cancer survival that had been
accumulated for over 30 to 40 years by reputable medical groups.
200
Judgment in plaintiffs favor was affirmed. 2° 1  Smith et al., v.
Daneshjoo, M.D. et al., 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4487(2nd Dist. August
23, 2002).
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion or Commit an Error
of Law When It Denied Patient's Motion to Remove the Nonsuit
Since the Patient's Expert Was Discredited on Cross Examination.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court's decision
denying the patient's motion to remove the nonsuit in favor of the
physician based on a claim alleging negligence arising out of the
performance of a hip replacement surgery during which the patient
suffered an injury to her sciatic nerve.202
193 ld.
194 Smith et al., 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4487 at *2.
'9' Id. at *5.
196 Id. at *7.
197 Id.
'98 Id. at *8
199 Smith et al., 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4487 at *11.
200 1d. at * 12.
201 Id. at *18.
202 Shirley Dietzel v. Andrew Gurman, M.D., Blair Orthopedic Associates, 2002
PA Super 291 at*P1.
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Andrew Gurman,, M.D. (physician) performed hip replacement
surgery on a patient during which she suffered an injury to her sciatic
nerve. 203  The physician testified the patient's injury was an
inexplicable complication that occasionally arises out of this type of
surgery.204 The patient's expert witness testified to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty the cause of injury to the patient was physician's
failure to visualize the sciatic nerve in order to protect it during surgery,
thereby dividing it.205 However, when the patient's expert viewed
evidence that the patient's injuries had vastly improved, he admitted he
was no longer comfortable saying the sciatic nerve had been divided
during surgery.206
The issue before the court was whether the trial court erred when
it refused to remove a compulsory nonsuit entered at the close of the
patient's case.207 The purpose of a compulsory nonsuit is to allow the
defendant to test the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence. 208 The
court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error
of law when it denied the patient's motion to remove the nonsuit.
209
The court reasoned that the evidence of improvement in the
functioning of the patient's muscle indicated the nerve could not have
been divided and thus, the patient had failed to establish either breach
of the standard of care or causation, which was necessary in proving
her case. 21 The patient's appeal for the removal of the order granting a
compulsory nonsuit at the close of her medical malpractice case against
the defendant was denied.21' Shirley Dietzel v. Andrew Gurman, MD.,
Blair Orthopedic Associates, 2002 PA Super 29.
203 Id. at *P2.
204 Id.
205 Id. at *P3.
206 Id. at *P 10.
207 Dietzel, 2002 PA Super 291 at *P 15.
208 Id. at *P17.
209 Id. at *P22.
210 Id. at *P22.
211 Id. at *22-23.
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INFORMED CONSENT
Prisoners' Informed Consent to the Administration of Medication
By Prison Officials Requires a Showing of "Voluntariness" and a
"Knowing and Intelligent Choice"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus
claiming lack of informed consent in her ingestion of prison
administered medication, upholding the conviction for second degree
murder.Z12
Appellant, Jane Ellen Benson, was arrested and convicted for the
shooting death of a friend, and was admittedly under the influence of a
methamphetamine at the time of the shooting.213 As the result of a
multitude of prior afflictions Benson submitted 90 medication requests
during the 87 days spent incarcerated prior to her sentencing.214 During
this time Benson temporarily refused her medication on three
occasions, failed to exercise offers to consult with her physician and
receive alternative treatment, and failed to request any additional
information regarding the medication she was receiving.
215
Benson's original petition contested her conviction on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds, claiming Benson was unable to receive a fair trial
because she had been medicated involuntarily.2 16  An evidentiary
hearing was held in response to Benson's petition, which concluded
finding Benson had neither been compelled to take any medication or
prejudiced during her trial.2 1 Following the denial of Benson's
petition and the California Supreme Court's denial of relief, Benson
appealed.21 8
The issue before the court was to determine the meaning of
voluntary as applied in the context of the administration of drugs to
prisoners. 2 19 The court held the district court's application of both
212 Benson v. Terhune, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18646 at *2 (N.D. Cal.
September 11, 2002).
213 Id. at *2.
214 Id. at *4-5.
215 Id. at *8, 9, 27.
216 Id. at *9.
217 Benson, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18646 at *10-11.
218 Id. at *11.
219 Id. at *18.
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Riggins and California Supreme Court cases dealing with informed
consent was appropriate and reasonable.220
In a de novo review the court applied the two-pronged informed
consent test to appellant's case. 22 The court determined the appellant
made a "free and unconstrained choice" in regards to taking her
medication because she was not coerced; she only exercised her right to
refuse medication three times, and when offered alternatives requested
222she opted for medication instead. Additionally, the court concluded
appellant was mentally capable of requesting any additional
information she may have desired concerning the medication
administered, and aware of her right to refuse the medication; however,
she failed to exercise these rights implying her "knowing consent."
223
Finally, appellant failed to produce evidence indicating that her trial
had in fact been prejudiced by the medication administered.224 Based
upon this analysis the court found appellant had exercised informed
consent in accepting the medication administered to her during trial;
and accordingly, the court upheld the district court's denial of writ of
habeas corpus relief.225 Benson v. Terhune, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS18646 (N.D. Cal. September 11, 2002).
INSURANCE
Beneficiary of Accidental Death Policy Cannot Recover Death
Benefits When the Policy Bars Recovery Where the Loss is
Indirectly or Directly the Result of Insured's Commission of a
Felonious Act and Insured Dies While Driving Intoxicated.
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the Second Judicial District
Court's order granting Sierra Health and Life Insurance Company's
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the unambiguous
felony exclusion in Sierra Health's accidental death policy, excluding
220 Id. at *19; see also, Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992)
(trial court denied prisoner the right to terminate her medication, such denial requires
that the state demonstrate the prisoner's need for the drug, and that the drug is
medically appropriate.)
221 Id. at *20, 22.
222 Benson, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18646 at * 20-22.
223 id. at *22-27.
224 id. at *27-28.
225 Id. at *30-31.
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recovery for death that is indirectly or directlya result of the insured's
commission of a felonious act even if accidental, bars the beneficiary
from recovering the accidental death benefit for insured's death while
driving intoxicated.226
While driving intoxicated, the insured failed to negotiate a left
turn, allowing his vehicle to drift right, causing it to strike a guardrail
and flip over, thereby killing himself and injuring his passenger, who is
also the beneficiary of his accidental death policy. 227  The accident
occurred in California and California law applied to determine whether
the insured's conduct was felonious. 22 Both the beneficiary and Sierra
Health agree that had the insured survived the accident, the State of
California could have prosecuted him for felonious drunk driving.
229
The Beneficiary made a timely request for payment of benefits
pursuant to the accidental death policy.230  Sierra Health denied the
beneficiary's request, relying on the policy's felony exclusion, which
precludes accidental death coverage if the insured dies while
committing a felony.
231
The beneficiary filed for declaratory relief from the district court.
Both parties moved for summary judgment.232  The district court
initially denied both parties' motions. 233 The parties then submitted a
joint motion for reconsideration with stipulated facts and, based upon
the stipulated facts, the district court granted Sierra Health's motion for
summary judgment and denied the beneficiary's motion. 234  The
beneficiary appealed.235
The Supreme Court of Nevada addressed three separate issues:
whether the Sierra Health accidental death policy's felony exclusion is
ambiguous and should be interpreted narrowly against the insurer,
whether the exclusion includes felonious drunk driving although it is
not an intentional crime and whether the exclusion applies when the
226 McDaniel v. Sierra Health and Life Ins. Co., 53 P.3d 904, 908 (Nev. 2002).
227 Id. at 905.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 McDaniel, 53 P.3d at 905.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 id.
235 id.
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insured's death was not proximately caused by the drunk driving.
236
The language of the Sierra Health policy plainly stated that a loss
directly or indirectly a result of an attempt to commit, or committing,
an assault or felony by the insured is not a covered loss even though it
was caused by an accidental bodily injury.237
In deciding whether the language of the exclusion provision is
ambiguous, the court, giving the terms their plain, ordinary and popular
meaning, held that the ordinary meaning of the term "felony" plainly
includes felonious drunk driving.2 38 In addressing the second issue the
court held the felony exclusion at issue applies to all felonies regardless
of criminal intent.239 Moreover, the court held even if Sierra Health's
felony exclusion were limited to intentional wrongdoings, the exclusion
still applies to felonious drunk driving because that felony, pursuant to
California and Nevada law, does not require criminal intent but merely
driving intoxicated resulting in serious bodily harm to another.
240
Lastly, the court found that the majority of courts interpreting
exclusionary provisions have applied felony exclusions when the loss is
remotely connected to any aspect of the insured's felonious conduct
when deciding whether there is some causal connection between the
felony and the loss suffered. 4 1 Therefore, the court held that the
insured's death did follow from his commission of felonious drunk
driving when looking at the totality of the circumstances.
242
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order granting
243Sierra Health's motion for summary judgment. McDaniel v. Sierra
Health and Life Ins. Co., 53 P. 3d 904 (Nev. 2002).
236 McDaniel, 53 P.3d at 906.
237 ld.
238 id.
239 Id. at 907.
240 Id.
241 McDaniel, 53 P.3d at 907.
242 Id. at 908.
243 id.
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JURY
Jury Instructions On Reasonable Degree of Medical Certainty and
Foreseeability Were Incorrect Statements of the Law Which May
Have Affected the Jury's Verdict.
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the judgment of the
Circuit Court in favor of the Hospital on a charge of negligent
treatment, but reversed and remanded its judgment in favor of the
physician on charges arising out of the misdiagnosis of injuries in
addition to subsequent and incorrect and negligent treatment of the
patient following a automobile accident.
244
The patient was taken to the hospital on November 30, 1997
following an automobile accident. 245 After being examined by the
emergency room physician at Clarksville Memorial Hospital
(Hospital), a CT scan was ordered 4. Dr. Miller, a surgeon, was called
in for the purposes of consultation to view the CT scan and examine the
patient for possible internal injuries. 247 While there appeared to be
some fluid around her liver, but Dr. Miller assumed that it was fatty
tissue as the patient was quite overweight.
248
When Dr. Miller saw the patient on the following afternoon he
said it would be fine for her to go home, although he did not discharge
her because she had to be seen by her orthopedic surgeon prior to
discharge. 24 9 The patient was discharged on the evening of November
30, 1997 with no discharge instructions. 250 On the night of December
1, she was found unconscious and died on the way to the hospital.25'
The autopsy showed the cause of death to be internal bleeding from a
laceration in the liver.
252
244 Vicki Bara, et al. v. Clarksville Memorial Health Systems, Inc., d/b/a
Clarksville Memorial Hospital, et al., 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 657 at * 1-2
(September 12, 2002).
245 Id. at *2.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id. at *3.
249 Bara, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 657 at *3.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id. at * 14.
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The issues before the court were: (1) whether it was error to
charge the jury that the Plaintiff's must prove causation to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty and (2) whether it was error to charge the
jury that they must find the child's death to be reasonably
foreseeable. 253  The court held the jury instructions of reasonable
degree of medical certainty and foreseeability were incorrect statements
of the law which most likely confused the jury and no doubt had an
affect on their verdict.
254
The rational behind the courts decision was that the term
"reasonable degree of medical certainty" was erroneous because the
term was synonymous with the phrase "more probably than not."255 On
the foreseeability instructions, the court reasoned that the Plaintiffs
were not required to prove that death was foreseeable, but merely that
some harm could have foreseeably resulted from the Defendant's action
or inaction. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the trial court's
judgment in favor of the physician and remanded for a new trial.256
The judgment in favor of the hospital was affirmed.15 Vicki Bara, ET
AL v. Clarksville Memorial Health Systems, Inc., d/b/a Clarksville
Memorial Hospital, ET AL., 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 657 (September
12, 2002).
MEDICAID
Medicaid Applicant Not Precluded From Bringing a Cause in State
Courts Premised on Federal Law After Failing to File a Timely
Appeal
The Court of Appeals of Indiana reversed and remanded the trial
court's dismissal, declaring no prerequisite mandated that Medicaid
applicants must exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to
filing a case in state court premised on federal law.
258
In the present case the Court decided whether the trial court
properly dismissed the petitioners' complaint alleging violation of
253 Id. at *2.
254 Bara, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 657 at *2.
255 Id. at *28.
256 id. at *32.
257 Id.
258 King v. Secretary, Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, 774
N.E.2d 1008 at * 1011 (Ind. App. Ct. 2002).
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particular federal rights when she did not conform to state
administrative agency filing deadlines. 259  The applicant's severe
physical and mental disabilities rendering her bedridden established her
eligibility for Medicaid. 26 Accordingly, the applicant received eight
hours of nursing and other health care services in her home each day.261
However, after requesting to extend her daily assistance by two hours,
the applicant was issued notice of a decrease in services to six hours
262each day. Delayed appeals made by her guardian were dismissed for
failure to timely file within 30 days of the decision.263
Moreover, Indiana's Administrative Orders and Procedures Act
(AOPA) requires one to exhaust all available administrative remedies
before filing a petition for judicial review. 264 Nevertheless, the court
agreed with appellant-petitioners' argument that she was not precluded
from bringing a state court action premised on the Americans with
Disabilities Act and § 1983 for her failure to exhaust all administrative
remedies. 265 Furthermore, the court ruled laws inhibiting § 1983 actions
are preempted by the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution.266
It follows that plaintiffs need not exhaust all administrative before
bringing actions under the Americans with Disabilities Act or § 1983.
Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the dismissal by the trial
court. 267  King v. Secretary, Indiana Family and Social Services
Administration, 774 N.E.2d 1008 at *1011 (Ind. App. Ct. 2002).
Florida "Preferred Drug List" Comports with Medicaid
The Eleventh Circuit held a Medicaid state law in Florida State Law,
which created a prior authorization pro gram, did not violate the
requirements of Medicaid Federal Statute.26
259 Id. at * 1009.
260 Id.
261 id.
26 2 id.
263 King, 774 N.E.2d 1008 at *1009.
264 Id. at *1010.
265 Id.
266 Id. at *1011.
267 Id. at *1012.
268 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) v.
Meadows, 304 F.3d 1197, 1212 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
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This new Florida law created a "preferred drug list"; if a drug is
not on the preferred list, then the physician must call the state
pharmacist for approval. 269 Utilizing the preferred drug list, the
pharmacist would suggest less expensive alternative drugs were on the
preferred drug list, as opposed to the drug originally selected by the
physician.270 If the physician wanted his first-choice drug guaranteed,
he must make a call the state physician before prescribing a drug not on
the list. 27 During the first three months of the program, 55 percent of
the calls resulted in a prescription change. 272 As a result, the trade
group Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA) brought suit against the administers of the Medicaid
Program, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), claiming
that the drug list reduced Medicaid market share for drugs not on the
preferred list.2
73
The court was called on to interpret this Florida law, and
determine whether the law is in effect, was a formulary in violation of
274Medicaid. Ph.RMA claimed the Florida law was a "formulary",
having the effect of excluding coverage of or payment for certain
Medicaid-eligible drugs within meaning of the federal law. 275 AHCA
argued to the contrary saying its "prior authorization program" was
authorized under federal law permits a because it met two
requirements: (1) a response (as to the chosen drug) was provided
within 24 hours of the request, and (2) a 72 hour supply of the drug was
made available in emergency situations. 276 These two requirements
have been adopted by the First Circuit, and thus far, the Supreme Court
has granted writ of certiorari on this issue.277
The court analyzed the law and said it was preempted and
therefore illegal if the program (1) made compliance between federal
and state regulation is impossible; and, (2) if this new state law did not
26,9 Id. at 1198.
270 m.271 Id.
272 Id.
273 PhRMA, 304 F.3d at 1199.
274 1&
275 Id.
276 [d. at 1200.
277 PhRMA, 304 F.3d at 1200-01. See PhRMA v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 76
(lst Cir. 2001); PhRMA v. Concannon, 122 S. Ct. 2657 (U.S. Jun. 28, 2002) (No. 01-
188).
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abide with congressional intent.278 However, the court found the
Florida law would not compromise patient care; additionally, it met the
objectives of Florida law because it contributed more funds into the
Medicaid through this program. 279 Furthermore, the court found
PhRMA's "formulary" argument inapplicable because the law did not
exclude all Medicaid-eligible drugs as long as the prescribing physician
calls the state pharmacist. 28 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for
AHCA. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v.
Meadows, 304 F.3d 1197, 1212 (11th Cir. 2002).
MENTAL HEALTH
Six Hour Time Limit Begins to Run After Statutory Requirements
are Met
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed a decision by the Court of
Appeals which permits a hospital to detain a person suspected to be
mentally ill for more than the six-hour time limit imposed by
Washington law. 281 The six hour-limit begins after the hospital staff
determines the patient should be referred to the designated County
Mental Health Professional.282
C.W. along with five other children were taken to a hospital in
response to complaints by onlookers suggested that he were exhibiting
strange and/or violent behavior outside a local coffee shop, and
disturbing those around him.283 C.W. was subsequently admitted to
Harborview hospital's triage unit, and diagnosed with an undefined
psychosis. 284 Between six and seven hours later, the social worker
referred C.W. to the Designated County Mental Health Professional
(DCMHP); she detained C.W. for an additional 72 hours for evaluation
and treatment. The state filed a petition for involuntary treatment, and
in response C.W. filed a claim alleging his due process rights were
violated when he was held for more than the six-hour limit defined by
278 PhRMA, 304 F.3d at 1205-06.
279 Id. at 1208-9.
280 Id.
281 In re Detention of C.W. et al., 2002 Wash. LEXIS 591 (Wash. 2002) at *1
282 Id.
283 Id. at *2
284 id.
2002]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
Washington law. 28 A similar set of facts occurred in the five other
cases mentioned in this case.
286
The issue before the court was to determine when the six-hour
time limit actually begins. The law states "a person may be referred to
a CDMHP for further treatment within a time frame of no more than six
hours from the time the professional staff determine that an evaluation
by the county designated mental health professional is necessary."
287
The court recognized that under this definition, the six-hour limit was
clearly unambiguous. However, the court also noted that while case law
has suggested the need to read and follow the plain language in statutes,
the court made an exception in instances where "the need to satisfy the
intent of the statute [would cause] absurd results." 288
The court held the law governing mental health detention required
several events to occur before the hospital staff could refer a person to a
county mental health professional.28x So, while the six-hour limit is
meant to prevent inappropriate or indefinite treatment, extended
detention such as in this case can encourage public safety, continuity of
care, and full use of existing agencies.290 Thus, the court affirmed the
decision by the Court of Appeals to read the statute to impose the six-
hour limit beginning after a referral to the county mental health
professional. 2 91 The court did, however, recognize the need for
procedural safeguards, noting that, in two of the cases, extended
detention was unwarranted. 292 Furthermore, the court held that even in
cases where extended detention was inappropriate, dismissal of the case
all together is not the best remedy. 293 In re Detention of C. W. et al.,
2002 Wash. LEXIS 591 (Wash. 2002).
285 In re C.W., 2002 Wash. LEXIS 591 (Wash. 2002) at *13-14.
286 Id. at *14
287 Id. at *16
288 Id. at * 18
289 (l.
290 In re C. W., 2002 Wash. LEXIS 591 (Wash. 2002) at *22
291 Id. at *40
292 Id. at *40-41
293 id.
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NEGLIGENCE
State Based Negligence Claims Against Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMO's) Are Not Preempted By ERISA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held state
based negligence claims against health maintenance organizations
(HMO) are not pre-empted by ERISA § 502(a), and should be heard by
state courts. 2 9 4 The court said such claims, when improperly removed
to circuit court on the basis of preemption or supplemental jurisdiction,
must be remanded to district court.
295
Each of the four plaintiffs involved in this appeal, which
originated out of three separate district court proceedings, claimed their
respective HMO had inappropriately refused to cover treatment and/or
prescriptions recommended by their physician. 296  In each case the
plaintiffs had suffered detrimental effects due to the lack of treatment,
or refusal to honor a prescription.
297
The HMO's sought removal based upon the contention the
plaintiffs' claims were preempted by their employers' federally
regulated ERISA plans. 298  Following removal, the district courts
dismissed the plaintiffs' claims citing ERISA preemption. 299 Upon a
motion to remand three of the four plaintiffs were denied.3 °° This
action is the result of plaintiffs' appeal of their denied remand, and the
HMO's, who was subjected to remand, appeal. 30 1
The issues before the court included whether plaintiffs' claims
were preempted by ERISA, and whether removal to district court was
appropriate in each case. 302 The court held that the three plaintiffs'
who originally set forth state based tort or negligence claims causes
were not preempted by ERISA § 502(a), and should be heard in state
294 Roark v. Humana, Inc., Calad v. Cigna Healthcare of Tex. Inc., Davila v.
Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19139 at *20, 28, 42 (N.D. Tex.
September 17, 2002).
295 Id. at *28, 30.
296 Id. at *1-8.
297 Id. at *2-8.
298 Id. at * 1.
299 Roark, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19139 at *1.
300 Id. at * 1.
302 Id.302 Id.
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court. 30 3 In regards to the fourth plaintiff, whose original complaint
was based upon a breach of contract, the court held the district court
properly exercised and retained jurisdiction. 304 In addition, the court
determined that the fourth plaintiffs cause of action was directly
preempted by ERISA §502(a)(1)(B). 315
The court analyzed complete preemption under ERISA § 502(a)
and conflict preemption under ERISA § 514, and determined that they
provided a federal cause of action governing situations in which
plaintiffs' HMO had breached their fiduciary duty.30 6 The court held
that those plaintiffs' who asserted state based negligence claims were
not suing under the contention that their HMO's had breached their
fiduciary duty; but rather, that their HMO's had negligently evaluated
whether the respective plaintiffs were eligible and in need of certain
treatments/medication. 30 7 Accordingly, the court determined that such
plaintiffs were not provided with recourse under ERISA, and therefore
their claims were not preempted. 30 8 The fourth plaintiff whose cause of
action was based upon their HMO's breach of fiduciary duty was
provided with recourse under a ERISA federal cause of action, and was
therefore determined to be preempted and a matter within the district
court's jurisdiction. 30 9 Roark v. Humana, Inc., Calad v. Cigna
Healthcare of Tex. Inc., Davila v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 19139 (N.D. Tex. September 17, 2002).
PROCEDURE
Proposed Class of Rezulin Users Failed to Meet Class Certification
Requirements Under Supreme Court Rule 23.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that a proposed class of plaintiffs who had ingested the
303 Id. at *28, 30, 33.
304 Roark, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19139 at *33.
305 Id.
306 Id. at *14-15.
301 Id. at *15, 17, 30. (see also, Pegram v. Herdich, 530 U.S. 211, 120 S. Ct.
2143 (2000).
308 Id. at *42.
309 Roark, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19139 at *41-42.
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prescription drug Rezulin failed to meet the requirements of class
certification as set forth in Supreme Court Rule 23.31 °
In 1996, Warner-Lambert Company ("Warner-Lambert")
announced the development of Rezulin, a new drug intended to prevent
and treat Type II diabetes. 311  The Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") approved Rezulin for use in conjunction with insulin therapy
and as a monotherapy. 312  In subsequent years, the FDA required
Warner-Lambert to change the Rezulin label several times after patients
experienced liver failure while on Rezulin.
313
On March 10, 2000, nearly four years after its introduction,
Rezulin had been linked to eighty-nine cases of liver failure, including
sixty-one that had resulted in death.314  Upon hearing this report,
Warner-Lambert withdrew Rezulin from the market. 3 15 Users of
Rezulin brought a complaint against Warner-Lambert alleging it failed
to adequately disclose the risks of liver and cardiopulmonary
complications associated with Rezulin. 316  Plaintiffs sought class
certification under Supreme Court Rule 23. 3 7
The first issue was whether the class of patients who ingested
Rezulin and their spouses qualified for class certification under
Supreme Court Rule 23. 3 18  The court held individual questions
substantially outweighed any common questions among members of
the proposed class. 319 The Court rejected the proposed class' attempt to
avoid individual determinations of damages by focusing on their prayer
for restitution of the purchase price and other equitable relief.32° The
court further held even in the absence of any individual claims for
compensatory damages, individual issues would still predominate on a
restitution claim.
32 1
310 In re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17204 at
*51 (S.D. N.Y. September 12, 2002).
3 ' Id. at *3.
312 Id. at *3-4.
113 1d. at *5-6.
114 Id. at *6-7.
"5 In re Rezulin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17204 at *6-7.
316 Id. at *9.
317 Id. at *1.
3I8 Id. at *14.
319 Id. at *23.
320 In re Rezulin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17204 at *24.
321 Id. at *28.
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The second issue was whether the subclass of Rezulin users who
had not manifested physical injury qualified for class certification
under Supreme Court Rule 23(b)(2).322  The subclass sought the
establishment and funding of a medical monitoring mechanism and
other relief.323 The court held the plaintiffs failed to establish that Rule
23(b)(2) applied to the proposed subclass. 324 Specifically, the plaintiffs
failed to persuade the court that reasonable plaintiffs would have sued
solely for a medical monitoring program, and a medical monitoring
action would be justified in absence of a significant claim for
damages. 325 The court further held even if Rule 23(b)(2) had been
properly invoked, the plaintiffs failed to satisfy its requirements, as
individual questions predominated over any common questions among
the proposed subclass. 326  Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for class
certification was denied in all respects. 327 In re: Rezulin Products
Liability Litigation, (N.Y. Sept. 12, 2002)(2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17204).
Objections to Defects of Form In an Affidavit Must Be Ruled Upon
in Order to Raise the Issue on Appeal, While Substantive Defects
May Be Raised For the First Time On Appeal.
The Court of Appeals of Texas, Sixth District, affirmed the trial court's
order granting summary judgment in favor of the medical center on a
claim alleging negligence arising out of a heart catherization procedure
performed on the patient that resulted in median nerve damage to his
328left side. The court, however, reversed and remanded the order of
summary judgment in favor of the physician arising out of the same
claim.
32 9
Jodie Trusty and his wife, Christine Trusty (collectively, Trusty)
sued Dr. John Strayhom (physician) and Texarkana Memorial Hospital,
322 Id. at *38.
323 id.
324 Id. at *48.
325 In re: Rezulin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17204 at *43, 45.
326 Id. at *50.
327 Id. at *51.
328 Jodie E. Trusty and wife, Christine Trusty v. John M. Strayhorn, M.D.,
Texarkana Memorial Hospital, d/b/a Wadley Regional Medical Center, and Billy D.
Parsons, M.D., 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 6667 at *1 (September 13, 2002)
329 Id.
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d/b/a Wadley Regional Medical Center (hospital) alleging the physician
with the assistance of the employees and agents of Wadley negligently
performed a heart catherization procedure on Jodie Trusty.33 ° After the
date for completing discovery had passed, both the physician and the
hospital filed motions for summary judgment.331 These motions wer;e
based upon Trusty's lack of evidence regarding the standard of care as
to the hospital, the breach of standard of care as to both the physician
and the hospital, and the causation elements as to both the physician
and the hospital.332
Trusty filed a response to the motion that included the affidavit of
Dr. Abul Aguam, who was not designated as a testifying expert.
333
Both the physician and the hospital moved to strike the affidavit, but
the court never ruled on this objection.334 Following a hearing, the
court granted both the physician and the hospital's motion for summary
judgment.335
The issue before this court was whether the trial court erred in
granting the summary judgment motion. 336 The appellate court held
that Trusty's failure to designate Dr. Aguam as a testifying expert was a
defect in form, but because both the hospital and the physician failed to
obtain an answer on their objection to the affidavit it could be used in
summary judgment proceedings. 337  The failure of an affidavit to
disclose an expert's qualifications is a substantive defect which could
be raised for the first time on appeal.338
Moreover, the court held because Aguam's affidavit did not
disclose that he was familiar with the standard of care for a nurse
treating a patient after a coronary arteriogram, summary judgment in
favor of the hospital was appropriate. 339 However, because Aguam's
affidavit shows he is familiar with the standard of care applicable to
physicians treating patients in Trusty's condition, summary judgment
330 id.
331 Id. at *2.
332 Id.
333 Trusty, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 6667 at *2, 9.
334 Id. at *2, 10.
335 Id.
336 Id. at *2.
337 Id. at *18-19.
33' Trusty, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 6667 at *22.
339 Id. at *23-24.
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in favor of the physician was inappropriate. 34  Thus, summary
judgment in favor of the hospital was affirmed, but summary judgment
in favor of the physician was severed and remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings. 34 1 Jodie E. Trusty and wife, Christine Trusty v.
John M. Strayhorn, M.D., Texarkana Memorial Hospital, d/b/a Wadley
Regional Medical Center, and Billy D. Parsons, M.D., No. 06-01-
00122-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 6667 (September 13, 2002).
Because a Sperm Bank Was a Health Care Provider, Petitioners
Should Have Complied With Procedural Requirements of Medical
Malpractice Actions In Order to Receive Additional Damages.
The State of California Court of Appeals held doctors and sperm a
bank, Cyrobank Inc. (Cryobank) acted as health care providers at the
time they performed professional services to petitioners.342 Because
petitioners failed to comply with a California civil statute, the trial
court fairly characterized the cause of action as one for wrongful life,
and petitioners were not entitled to recover general damages or
damages for lost earnings.
343
Parent petitioners sued Cryobank on behalf of their daughter
Brittany, alleging the company failed to disclose that the sperm sold to
them in order to conceive their daughter, came from a donor with a
history of a kidney disease called autosomal dominant polycystic
kidney disease (ADPKD).344 The parents sued for professional
negligence, fraud, and breach of contract claiming Cryobank knew of
donor's familial history of kidney disease but failed to test for any
evidence of kidney disease and the ADPKD gene.345 Their daughter
was later diagnosed with this serious disease.
346
California law imposes procedural requirements on a party
claiming punitive damages in a medical malpractice action. 347 The law
states "in any action for damages arising out of the professional
340 Id.
341 Id. at *25.
342 Johnson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 101 Cal. App. 4th 869,
874 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
343 Id. at 889
344 Id. at 873.
34 Id. at 874.
346 Id.
147 Johnson, 101 Cal. App. 4th 869 at 877
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negligence of a health care provider (emphasis added), no claim for
punitive damages shall be included in a complaint or other pleading
unless the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that
includes a claim for punitive damages to be filed. 3 48 The motion must
be filed within two years after the complaint or initial pleading is filed
or not less than nine months before the date the matter is first set for
trial, whichever is earlier.349 Petitioners did not include this information
in their complaint.
350
The issue before this court was whether Cryobank acted as a heath
care provider when it rendered services to petitioners, because if they
were deemed to be a health care provider, then petitioners needed to
amend there complaint in compliance with California law.351 The court
said "there is no question that Cryobank dispenses a product (sperm),
and provides a service by [dispensing] donor sperm to health care
practitioners and their clients."' 352 The court applied two factors to label
Cryobank as a health care provider; the factors discussed in Coe said an
entity is a health care provider if (1) it dispenses product(s), and (2) if
the entity provides a service that is "inextricably identified with the
health of humans". 353 There was clear evidence to support such a
conclusion here.
354
However, because petitioners failed to comply with the law and
include a claim for punitive damages against Cryobank in their
complaint, the court ruled that damages would be limited to those
arising out of a wrongful life claim; all other claims were
inapplicable. 355 The court denied petitioners writ of mandate, and they
were ordered to pay their own costs. Johnson v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, 101 Cal. App. 4th 869, (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
348 id.
349 Id.
350 Id. at 886.
351 Id.
352 Johnson, 101 Cal. App. 4th 869 at 881
353 Id.
354 Johnson, 101 Cal. App. 4th 869 at 882; see also Coe v. Superior Court, 220
Cal. App. 3d 48.
151 Id. at 889
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REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
A District Court Judge's Issuance of a Pre-Enforcement Injunction
Preventing an Indiana Statute Requiring a Woman's Informed
Consent Before an Abortion to Take Effect is Held to Be an Abuse
of Discretion When There is Insufficient Evidence of an Undue
Burden On Abortion Rights
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana's
permanent pre-enforcement injunction of a provision of Indiana
informed-consent legislation. 356  The provision required oral
information be provided, eighteen hours before the abortion, in the
presence of the pregnant woman by the physician performing the
abortion, the referring physician, or a physician assistant. 357 The Court
found that the record did not contain sufficient evidence to hold the
Indiana informed-consent law invalid on its face because the evidence
was insufficient to show an undue burden on abortion. 358 Furthermore,
the court held, irrespective of studies conducted in Mississippi and
Utah, the informed-consent law must be afforded the opportunity to be
evaluated when put into effect in Indiana. 3
59
In 1995 the State of Indiana enacted a statute making the woman's
informed consent a condition to an abortion. 360 Although the text of the
law is materially identical to one held constitutional in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a federal district
court issued a preliminary injunction preventing the statute from taking
effect. 36' Two years later, the district court modified the injunction to
permit enforcement of most of the law but blocking enforcement of the
requirement that information be provided orally "in the presence of the
pregnant woman, by the physician who is to perform the abortion, the
referring physician or a physician assistant.
362
356 A Woman's Choice - East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, U.S. App.
LEXIS 18840 at *25 (7th Circ. September 16, 2002).
357 Id.
358 Id. at *22.
359 Id. at *24-25.
36
1 Id. at * 1.
361 East Side Women's Clinic, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18840 at *1.
362 Id. at * 1-2.
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Four years after the partial injunction, the district court held a trial
and made the modified injunction permanent, finding that the statute
obliges the woman to make two trips to the clinic or hospital, raising
the financial and mental cost of an abortion. 363 The district court held,
based on studies concerning similar laws in Mississippi and Utah, the
higher cost will reduce the number of abortions performed in Indiana.
364 The district court concluded that some women will travel to states
that do not require two trips, some will forego an abortion, and some
will delay the abortion until the second trimester. 365 The district court
further concluded that experience in Indiana showed that the demand
for abortion did not decline when information was disseminated by
paper or telephone, implying the decline was attributable to the higher
cost not the influence of the information. 36 6 The district court held
these consequences created an undue burden on abortion.
367
The first issue addressed by the Seventh Circuit is how the factual
arguments made by the district court are to be evaluated. 368  The
Seventh Circuit found that normally a court, in determining the possible
effects of a statute, does not hold trial but asks only whether a proper
outcome is possible. 369 However, when a district court does take
evidence in such matters and makes findings on that evidence, the
appellate court will evaluate the matters with a heavy presumption in
favor of the statute's constitutional application. 370 The Seventh Circuit
noted that abortion implicates fundamental rights indicating a high
standard of review but a law that regulates an ancillary issue, such as
informed consent, does not affect fundamental rights unless the
informed consent rule creates an undue burden on the underlying right
to an abortion. 37 1 Thus, the Seventh Circuit relied on Stenberg v.
Carhart372 indicating that the undue burden standard must be applied
logically and to the nation as a whole, rather than one state at a time.
373
363 Id. at *2.
364 Id.
365 Id.
366 East Side Women's Clinic, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18840 at *3.
367 Id. at *2.
368 Id. at *8.
369 id.
370 id.
37 ' East Side Women's Clinic, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18840 at *9.
372 530 U.S. 914, 120 S.Ct. 2597 (2000).
373 East Side Women's Clinic, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18840 at *9.
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Therefore, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the study findings in
Mississippi and in Utah, relied on by the district court, do not conclude
that the same will be true of the law's effect in Indiana or that the
effects of the law in Indiana will amount to an undue burden.
374
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held there is no evidence on record
available for an accurate assessment of the state statute's effects on
women seeking an abortion because Indiana, unlike Mississippi and
Utah, has been blocked from enforcing the statute as written.375
The final issue the Seventh Circuit addressed is whether the
statute's two-visit requirement imposes an undue burden on abortion.
376
The Seventh Circuit applied the rule in Casey stating that a law
"ha[ving] the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion" is an undue burden. 377 The
Seventh Circuit compared the statute's two-visit requirement to the
spousal-notification requirement in Casey, which the Supreme Court
held to be an undue burden because of the substantial obstacle it placed
in front of many women with abusive partners. 378  However, the
Seventh Circuit determined that the statute's emergency-bypass clause,
which covers any kind of psychological or physical risk to the woman,
alleviates the substantial obstacle presented in Casey.379 Furthermore,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the two-visit requirement does not
create an undue burden because it does not facilitate domestic violence
or invite domestic intimidation sufficient to reach a substantial
obstacle, even if the rule may be interpreted as burdensome. 380
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's permanent
injunction and held that the statute must be allowed to go into effect as
written in order to determine whether the statute fails to protect
Indiana's women from risks of mental or physical harm. 3 8 1 The
Seventh Circuit further held that it is an abuse of discretion for a district
judge to issue a pre-enforcement injunction while the effects of a law
and the reasons for those effects are open for debate. 3  A Woman's
114 Id. at 10-13.
311 ld. at *18.
376 Id. at *18.
377 Id. at *19.
37' East Side Women's Clinic, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18840 at *20.
311 1d. at *2 1.
310 Id. at *22.
381 Id. at *23.
382 Id. at *25.
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Choice - East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
18840 (7th Circ. September 16, 2002).
South Carolina Abortion Clinic Regulation 6-12 Survives
Constitutional Challenges
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed and
reversed in part several facial constitutional challenges to South
Carolina Regulation 61-12 ("the Regulation") "Standards for Licensing
Abortion Clinics., 383 The court concluded here is no due process
violation where there is a requirement for abortion clinics have
admitting privileges to local hospitals and referral arrangements with
relevant experts. 384 Second, an arrangement for referral services to
clergy is not, on its face, a violation of First Amendment freedom of
religion. 385 Third, where a reasonable person would be able to interpret
the regulation and determine what is prohibited Regulation 61-12 is not
void for vagueness in violation of the Due Process Clause. 386 Finally
there is no violation of the right to privacy when Department inspectors
have access to all patient records and it relates to the overall health and
safety purposes of Regulation 61-12. 387
The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control promulgated Regulation 61-12 containing ten chapters
consisting of definitions and regulations of abortion clinics for
licensure, operational policies and procedures, patient care standards
including the requirement of access to outside facilities such as local
hospitals, arrangements for consultation or referral services including
clergy, storage of records and mandatory state reporting, safety
regulations, and prerequisites for initial licensure. 3 88 The day before
the Regulation was to take effect an action was brought by two abortion
clinics and a doctor on behalf of themselves and their patients
challenging the constitutionality of the Regulation on numerous
grounds.
3 89
383 Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, No. 0 1-2090, 01-2235, 2002 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19275 at *2-40 (4th Cir. S.C. September 19, 2002).
384 Id.
385 Id.
386 id.
387 id.
388 Greenville, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19275 at *3-6.
389 Id. at *7.
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The court initially noted that facial challenges are "the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must
establish that no set of circumstances exist under which the Act would
be valid., 390 The court's logic, as to the admitting privileges to local
hospitals and referral arrangements, was there existed only speculation
where evidence is required to rebut the regulation's presumptive
constitutionality, since the appellants have obtained the required
licenses, and the possibility of denial by the outside facilities is
minuscule.391 Pertaining to the claim of a religious freedom violation,
the court reasoned the appellants misread the Regulation where it did
not require the abortion clinics to become involved in religion, but only
to have arrangements for referring patients to clergy when the patient
requests it.
392
The court further upheld the Regulation, against the appellants'
claim of void for vagueness, where an ordinary person of reasonable
intelligence reading the Regulation in its entirely and context would be
able to interpret and determine what is both required and prohibited and
therefore it does not promote arbitrary or discriminatory treatment.
393
Finally, the court failed to find an invasion of privacy where the State's
documentation requirements relate directly to the health and safety
purposes of Regulation 61-12, and there exists only a remote possibility
of inadequate protection against disclosure. 394  The Court therefore
concluded there was no per se violations, and affirmed in part,
upholding the Regulation, and reversed in part the appellants' cross-
appeal. 395 Greenville Women's Clinic v. Bryant, No. 01-2090, 01-2235,
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19275 (4th Cir. S.C. September 19, 2002).
390 Id. at *12.
311 Id. at *11-14.
392 Id. at * 16.
393 Greenville, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19275 at *23-24.
394 Id. at *32-36.
391 Id. at *40.
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WRONGFUL DEATH
State Did Not Waive Governmental Immunity Following
Determination That Psychiatric Hospital Restroom Did Not
Contain "Dangerous or Defective Condition"
The Supreme Court of Michigan held the state did not waive
governmental immunity after concluding that the overhead bar in the
psychiatric hospital's restroom was not a "dangerous or defective
condition.
3 96
In the present case the Court reviewed the trial court's decision de
novo, to determine whether the hospital restroom in which the
plaintiffs' decedent hung himself contained a "dangerous or defective
condition. 397 The decedent hung himself by fastening his belt to the
overhead bar of a restroom stall in the hospital, which he was being
held and monitored. 39 The plaintiffs' complaint alleged the overhead
bar constituted a "dangerous or defective condition."399 In its review,
the Court tested the factual support for the claim, thereby assuring that
the trial Court reviewed the nonmoving party's evidence in the most
favorable light.4 ° °
"Dangerous or defective condition" is the third part of a five-part
test derived from the case controlling this issue, Jackson v. Detroit.
40 1
With striking similarity, Jackson involved a detainee who attempted to
hang himself from the overhead bar of a restroom in the police
station.402 In Jackson, the Court concluded there was nothing wrong
with the bathroom, and the overhead bars were not a "dangerous or
defective condition.,
40 3
Furthermore, a defective condition may be evaluated by
404considering the specific uses of the room. Following consideration
396 Francine Cullari de Sanchez v. State of Michigan, 651 N.W.2d 59 at *62
(Mich. 2002).
39' Id. at *60-61.
398 Id. at *60.
399 id.
400 Id. at *61.
401 De Sanchez v. State, 651 N.W.2d at *61 (discussing Jackson v. Detroit, 449
Mich. 420, 537 N.W.2d 151 (1995)).402 id.
403 Id.
404 fd. at *62.
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of the bathroom, the court concluded that the bar was neither defective
in its support of the stall, nor a dangerous threat to psychiatric
patients.4 °5 In addition, the Michigan statute establishes the repair and
maintenance duties governmental agencies have when they control
public buildings being held open to the public.40 6  Although
governmental agencies are generally immune from tort liability,
"dangerous or defective conditions" resulting from failure to comply
with the statute may provide an exception, giving rise to governmental
liability. 40 7 Waiver of immunity may result if the government agency
failed to make necessary repair or replacements to protect the public
from the defective condition within a reasonable period of time after
obtaining actual or constructive knowledge of the defect.
40 8
Moreover, in it's discussion of the underlying policy behind the
public building exception, the Court concluded that the purpose of the
exception was to encourage maintenance of safe public buildings, and
not the safety in those buildings. 40 9 For all of these reasons the Court
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals reinstating summary
judgment for the defendants. 4  Francine Cullari de Sanchez v. State of
Michigan, 651 N. W.2d 59 at *60 (Mich. 2002).
The Standard of Care for Negligence and Wrongful Death is the
Standard Followed in the Medical Community at the Time the
Events Took Place
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated
judgments for patients against a group of doctors for claims of
negligence and wrongful death in performing an experimental
treatment for brain cancer. 4  Because the treatment took place over
forty years before the trial date, and the doctors had used the
appropriate standard of care, there was insufficient evidence to meet the
plaintiffs' burden of proof.412
405 Id.
406 De Sanchez, 651 N.W.2d at *60.
407 Id.
408 11.
409 Id. at *62.
410 Heinrich v. Sweet 2002 WL 1941483 at *1 (Mass. Aug. 27, 2002).
411 Id. at *1
412 Id. at *2
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In the early 1960s, several patients received Boron Neutron
Capture Therapy ("BNCT") for terminal brain cancer. 413 BNCT
combined chemotherapy with radiation in hopes of producing a
localized dose of radiation that would kill abnormal cells while
avoiding healthy cells. 4 14 Over a decade went by with little success
shown with BNCT; but, after improvements were made in the delivery
mechanism of the therapeutic dose, a number of patients consented to
the treatment.415 While preliminary results proved promising, the
doctors later concluded that the BNCT trials had failed.416
The estates of the patients brought suit in district court and were
granted relief on grounds of negligence and wrongful death because
there appeared no credible reason the doctor would believe the therapy
would be successful.417 The defendants appealed, challenging the
insufficiency of evidence against them and argued the district court
should have entered judgment as a matter of law in their favor.4 1 8 At
trial, the court found no evidence. in the record that BNCT hastened
decedents' deaths; the evidence was overwhelmingly inconsistent with
the verdicts for plaintiffs on their wrongful death claims and was
insufficient to uphold those verdicts. 419 Similarly, the plaintiffs lacked
sufficient evidence to uphold the negligence claims.
420
The court ruled that where the jury was asked to evaluate the
doctor's conduct many years after the events took place, it is important
that the correct standard of care is the standard in the medical
421community at time the treatments were given. While BNCT was later
found to be ineffective, the doctors did not deviate from the standard of
care practiced in early 1960's in regards to experimental cancer
treatment; the court found no evidence that this standard of care was
violated.422 In addition, the court found that the patients were
adequately informed about the treatment, its experimental nature, and
its known risks, and agreed to undergo the treatment nonetheless.
413 Id. at *3
414 Id.
4'5 Heinrich, 2002 WL 1941483 at *4
416 Id. at *4-5
417 Id. at *5
418 Id. at *4.
49 Id. at *7.
420 Heinrich, 2002 WL 1941483 at *7
421 Id. at *12.
422 Id. at * 18.
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Defendants cannot be liable for performing the very treatment to which
the patients agreed.423 The jury verdict for the plaintiffs on the
negligence and wrongful death claims was vacated, and judgement was
entered in favor of the defendants. 424 Heinrich v. Sweet 2002 WL
1941483 at *1 (Mass. Aug. 27, 2002).
423 Id. at *17.
424 Id. at *19
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